Currently we face Russia's regime fighting a war in Ukraine. At the same time, Russia is intimidating its other neighbours, exerting its power upon Moldova and Georgia, disguising its military activities in Eastern Ukraine, violating its major international obligations. It is recruiting, training and commanding so-called separatists in the East in order to destabilise the rest of Ukraine. Russia aims by all possible means to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence by reverting/discouraging Ukraine's European direction.
It claims NATO for an expansion and at the same time annexes Crimea. This hypocritical behaviour can be illustrated by the most recent Putin's quote: 'It is NATO, which is coming closer to our borders, not us moving somewhere'.
The recent Russia's military activities, messaging and some doctrinal intentions are exceptionally worrisome. For example, Russia's strategic intentions to use nuclear weapons early in conventional regional conflicts for the purpose of deescalation; currently observed over-flights of Russian strategic aviation in a close vicinity of NATO borders; Russia's proclaimed intentions to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea, and to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, also Putin's most recently announced intention to obtain 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of piercing any missile defences.
Before the aggression against Ukraine, Moscow sat together in the NATORussia Council and within the G-8, among many other diplomatic forums. It has been offered numerous ways by NATO and the European Union to cooperate -it has only chosen in many cases, such as with the EU Neighbourhood Policy, to decline. It was on Russia's demand that the infamous Corfu Process had been initiated and conducted in the OSCE for a good couple of years to discover that the very demandeur was not interested in joining the consensus among participating states.
NATO has been reaching out to Russia in a transparent and constructive spirit over the last 25 years, including through the Partnership for Peace Programme, NATO-Russia Council, based upon NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. However, Russian aggressive military activities in Georgia and Ukraine clearly demonstrated that Russia was not interested anymore in the implementation of international commitments and principles, including the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.
By agreeing to the Founding Act of relationship with NATO, Russia committed to reduce its conventional and nuclear forces and to withhold from using force to settle disputes among states. Instead, it has violated these and other provisions in Georgia and now in Ukraine, thus rejecting its own pledges and assuming confrontational posture with Alliance.
Unfortunately, the future is less clear now than it was two years ago. Russia has undermined the predictable, rules-based European security order, the fundamental principles of which are enshrined in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Russia is deliberately undermining those principles. The principles cannot be renegotiated on the basis of Russia's hypocritical actions, to attain its foreign policy goals.
It was only right and obvious that in response to the Crimea annexation and Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine the Alliance had to discontinue practical cooperation of the NATO-Russia Council. As and until Russia's intent and policies are not changed, the resumption of the NRC cooperation activities has no reason; neither has it any pragmatic meaning.
Before any eventual dialogue between NATO and Russia is relaunched, we will have to ensure that it is not at the cost of our security that it will not harm the Alliance's cohesion, and that it will not weaken the Euro-Atlantic stability itself. Any possible way ahead with Russia should not be at the cost of our principles, values and security of our neighbours and partners, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
We all know Russia is serious when they come back to the table and respond to our strong and principled proposals. If we are going to resume the possible cooperation with Russia, it should definitely be based on principles, values and commitments, and naturally this re-engagement would be based on lower level of trust, expectation and without any wishful thinking. It must take into consideration a thorough and informed analysis of Russia's domestic and foreign policies, and its military and security doctrines, including its nuclear posture. The re-engagement must be tied with fundamental principles of international security and based on conditions agreed by Allies. We all know Russia is serious when they come back to the table and respond to our strong and principled proposals.
Even in such a difficult and complex environment, contacts and communication lines with Russia are still possible, needed and available. -Diplomatic dialogue with Russia can be maintained at NATO's 50-member Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which includes the other eastern partners such as Ukraine. These can and should be used to avoid misunderstandings and/or minimise escalations, especially when Russian military do engage in frequently unannounced snap exercises. The question remains -if the Russian counterparts will be picking up when rung.
The full implementation of the Minsk Agreements (however bleak the prospects of it in light of recent attacks by the Russian-led separatists may seem) remains the best way to end this tragedy. Certainly, full implementation of the Minsk commitments by Russia will be one important litmus test for the Alliance's future re-engagement with it.
NATO has always been open about its exercises and capabilities in line with Vienna Document confidence and security building measures and its partnership commitments. Just recently, during the meeting between the NATO Secretary General and Russia's Foreign Minister, the former handed over the list of NATO's planned exercises to his Russian colleague. However, to be effective, confidence and security-building measures should be implemented in good faith, in reciprocal and predictable manner. Russia so far has not demonstrated such openness as it comes to its military activities, deployments and exercises.
Russia has suspended implementation of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It has restricted over-flights under the Open Skies Treaty (excluded Kaliningrad from the airports used for Open Skies Treaty). And it continues to use no-notice snap exercises to disguise major troop movements, including on the Ukrainian border. This neither increases transparency and predictability, nor does it reduce the risk of conflict and miscalculation.
All those activities go together with hybrid tactics, when the line between war and peace, true and lie is blurred and in this way the ambiguity and possibility for miscalculation is exceptionally high. It is obvious that in this way the moral principles are being downgraded and the level of trust and predictability in the region is moribund.
The Russia regime's behaviour has created a new strategic reality for NATO. After 25 years of focusing on out-of-area crisis management and on good-willed partnership with then strategic neighbour Russia, we now must re-emphasise our original mission of collective defence.
Strengthening NATO response to this challenge is preventive, not escalatory measure. By demonstrating capability to defend its Allies, the Alliance has the best chance and obligation to deter and discourage today's Russia from intimidation, sabre-rattling, propaganda and provocation. NATO's principal/foremost mission is now to adequately deter Russia's escalatory behaviour as well as to adapt its defence and deterrence posture to changed security environment. While any resumption of meaningful dialogue with Russia, which obviously will not be the same as it was, much depends on Russia's behaviour.
Allies should continue to call Russia to change course, and to end its selfimposed isolation, bearing in mind that the fundamental principles that underpin
